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SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF TAX-TREATY
SHOPPING THROUGH THE USE OF
LIMITATION ON BENEFITS PROVISIONS
Anna A. Kornikova*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the United States signed double taxation conventions
(DTCs) with Iceland and Bulgaria, as well as a protocol to the 1980
Canada-U.S. DTC.1 A common feature of these instruments is a com-
prehensive Limitation on Benefits (LOB) provision, which ensures
that treaty benefits flow only to residents of the United States and the
other treaty signatory, as opposed to third-country residents.2 The
United States includes LOB provisions in all newly signed DTCs.3
This policy addresses the United States' concern regarding "treaty
shopping" 4-a form of treaty abuse which occurs when taxpayers cre-
ate artificial entities or transactions in treaty jurisdictions with the
purpose of obtaining treaty benefits.5
* J.D. Candidate and Fellow at The Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of Inter-
national Business Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A. and M.A., summa cum laude,
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contacted by e-mail at anna.kornikova@brooklaw.edu.
1 See Income Tax Convention Between the United States and Bulgaria, U.S.-
Bulg., Feb. 23, 2007; Protocol Amending the Income Tax Convention Between the
United States and Canada, U.S.-Can., Sept. 21, 2007; Income Tax Convention Be-
tween the United States and Iceland, U.S.-Ice., Oct. 23, 2007, available at http:l
ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/treaties.html.
2 Pending Income Tax Agreements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) (statement of Patricia A. Brown, Deputy International
Tax Counsel for Treaty Affairs, Dept. of Treasury).
3 See U.S. DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON EARNINGS STRIP-
PING, TRANSFER PRICING AND U.S. INCOME TAX TREATIES 5, 74-85 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter REPORT ON TAX TREATIES], available at www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/
library/ajca2007.pdf.
4 Id.
5 SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR., U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING AND POLICY IN-
CLUDING CROSS-BORDER MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 169 (2007).
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Some commentators and foreign officials have characterized
the U.S. approach to LOB provisions as "paranoid"' and as an "over-
reaction."7 LOB provisions have been criticized as potentially imped-
ing the ability of the United States to attract foreign capital,' as
redundant due to the existence of anti-abuse rules in U.S. domestic
law,9 and as possibly incompatible with the law of the European
Union.' ° This Comment addresses each of these concerns.
The Comment argues that unilateral anti-abuse measures,
such as domestic laws, may not adequately address the problem of
treaty shopping. As treaty shopping stems from a lack of coordination
between domestic systems of taxation, unilateral anti-abuse measures
should be supplemented by a consistent use of the LOB provision in
DTCs. The argument proceeds in three parts. Part II examines the
treaty shopping phenomenon in the context of the U.S. and global tax
policies. Part III assesses domestic unilateral anti-abuse measures,
provides a comparative perspective on unilateral anti-abuse measures
in Canada, India and the European Union, and analyzes the compati-
bility of such measures with the DTC obligations of signatories as a
matter of international law. Part IV analyzes the evolution and
mechanics of the LOB provision of the United States Model Income
Tax Convention of November 15, 2006" (2006 U.S. Model) and re-
sponds to recent criticisms of this provision. The Comment concludes
that LOB provisions are a necessary collective measure, which facili-
tates the concerted effort to harmonize national tax systems.
6 Simone M. Haug, The United States Policy of Stringent Anti-Treaty-Shopping
Provisions: A Comparative Analysis, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 191, 197 (1996).
7 Phillip F. Postlewaite et al., The A.L.I. Tax Treaty Study - A Critique and A
Modest Proposal, 52 TAX LAw. 731, 770 (1999) (stating that the American Law
Institute "believes that the United States has, in general, overreacted to the treaty
shopping problem").
8 Raymond Wacker, Anti-Treaty Shopping Restrictions in the New U.S.-Nether-
lands Tax Treaty, 45 TAX ExEc. 383, 389 (1993).
9 See, e.g., Richard L. Reinhold, What is Tax Treaty Abuse? (Is Treaty Shopping an
Outdated Concept?), 53 TAX L. 663 (2000).
10 See, e.g., Ruth Mason, U.S. Tax Treaty Policy and the European Court of Jus-
tice, 59 TAX L. REv. 65 (2005).
" U.S. Model Income Tax Convention of Nov. 15, 2006, [1 IRS Forms] Tax Trea-
ties (CCH) 209 (2007) [hereinafter 2006 U.S. Model], available at http://www.
ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hpl6801.pdf.
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II. TREATY SHOPPING: MECHANICS AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS
The existing network of over fifty DTCs between the United
States and other countries 12 creates significant tax planning opportu-
nities for taxpayers. DTCs ameliorate the effects of juridical double
taxation (taxation by more than one jurisdiction on the same item of
income). 3 The 2006 U.S. Model, similar to the Model Tax Convention
developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Devel-
opment (OECD), 4 reduces taxation at the "source" (the jurisdiction
where the income arises,' 5 as opposed to the "residence" jurisdiction,
the taxpayer's fiscal domicile). 16 Taxpayers use DTCs to reduce costs
of doing business and/or increase net investment returns, for example,
musician Mick Jagger and the rock band The Rolling Stones report-
edly have taken advantage of the extensive treaty network of the
Netherlands, where the band established an entity for licensing its
music.'" As Judge Learned Hand pointed out, "there is nothing sinis-
ter in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible."'"
Seeking to reduce their tax liability, however, some taxpayers
engage in "treaty shopping"-a form of treaty abuse.' 9 There exists no
uniform definition of "treaty shopping, "20 but the term usually refers
to situations where residents of third States otherwise ineligible for
treaty benefits create artificial entities referred to as "conduits"2 ' or
12 I.R.S. Publication No. 519, U.S. Tax Guide for Aliens, § 9, 9.1 (Mar. 12, 2008)
(providing a list of tax treaties in effect), available at 2007 WL 4986573 (I.R.S.).
13 Georg W. Koefler & Ruth Mason, Double Taxation: A European "Switch in
Time?", 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 64 n.9 (2007).
14 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, MODEL TAx
CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (2008) [HEREINAFTER OECD MODEL].
15 F8LIX ALBERTO VEGA BORREGO, LIMITATION ON BENEFITS CLAUSES IN DOUBLE
TAXATION TREATIES 15, 24 (2006).
16 Richard L. Reinhold, Some Things that Multilateral Tax Treaties Might Use-
fully Do, 57 TAX LAw. 661, 663 (2003).
17 Joseph B. Darby III et al., When Tax Planning Rocks: How the Rolling Stones
Went Dutch to Cut Taxes, PRACTICAL US/INT'L TAX STRATEGIES, June 30, 2007, at
6-11.
18 ROBERT KINSMAN, THE ROBERT KINSMAN GUIDE TO TAX HAVENS 1 (1978).
19 See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS
ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN TAX MATTERS; TREATY ABUSE AND TREATY
SHOPPING, 21-24, U.N. Doc. E/C.18/2006/2 (2006) [hereinafter UN REPORT ON
TREATY SHOPPING].
20 id.
21 Treas. Reg. § 1.881-3(a)(2)(ii)(B) (defining "conduit" as "an intermediate entity
whose participation in a financing arrangement may be disregarded in whole or in
part under the regulations"); BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME AND FOREIGN TAXPAYERS
para. 66.2.10 (2d ed. 1997) (stating that "[glenerally, an intermediate entity is a
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enter into artificial transactions in a treaty jurisdiction to access
treaty benefits.2 2 In this sense, it is clear that treaty shopping differs
from "tax evasion" in employing means, such as creation of "postbox"
or "shell" corporations, that are legal in their form. 23 Some commenta-
tors distinguish between treaty shopping where taxpayers are merely"searching for a more favorable treaty" from abusive treaty shopping
involving an indirect violation of the object or purpose of the treaty.24
This Comment will focus on the abusive treaty shopping, which can be
demonstrated by examples of specific patterns.
A. The Mechanics of Treaty Shopping
The 1964 case involving a famous Swedish heavyweight boxer
Ingemar Johansson 25 illustrates a classic treaty shopping pattern. Jo-
hansson made arrangements to receive his U.S. income as a sole em-
ployee of a Swiss corporation,2 6 which claimed an exemption from U.S.
tax under the U.S.-Swiss tax treaty. The arrangement would have
reduced Johansson's U.S. tax liability by almost a million dollars in
1960 and 1961.2' But the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the U.S.
courts denied treaty benefits in this arrangement. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit emphasized the lack of a busi-
ness purpose in the Swiss entity and its nature as a conduit for escap-
ing U.S. taxes.29 The court reasoned that the purpose of the treaty is
to eliminate the impediments of double taxation in international com-
merce,30 which were not implicated in this case.
With the development of anti-abuse rules in DTCs and domes-
tic revenue laws, treaty shopping patterns became more sophisticated.
In addition to the "direct conduit" scheme, under which an intermedi-
ary company is formed in a country which affords treaty benefits,3 '
conduit if its participation in the financing arrangement reduces tax under § 881
and is "pursuant to a tax avoidance plan").
22 UN REPORT ON TREATY SHOPPING, supra note 19, 21-24.
23 Haug, supra note 6, at 191, 199 n.19.
24 UN REPORT ON TREATY SHOPPING, supra note 19, 24.
25 Johansson v. United States, 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964).
26 Id. at 811.
27 The United States imposes tax on U.S.-source income of non-U.S. persons. See
26 U.S.C. § 871(a)(1)(A) (2006) (tax on nonresident alien individuals); 26 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(1) (2005) (tax on income of foreign corporations not connected with U.S.
business).
28 Johansson, 336 F.2d at 811.
29 Id. at 813.
30 Id.
31 BORREGO, supra note 15, at 20.
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taxpayers also use "stepping stone conduits."3 2 Under that scheme, in-
termediary companies exploit the availability of deductions for ex-
penses incurred by affiliates-residents of third-party States.3 3
Taxpayers in third-party jurisdictions have also used agents, repre-
sentatives, fiduciary arrangements and trusts (in each case, with vary-
ing success) to access treaty benefits available in jurisdictions outside
of the taxpayers' residence. 34 The underlying theme in these schemes
is that they enable taxpayers to access treaty benefits in a manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the treaty, namely, to provide tax
benefits to the residents of the treaty jurisdictions. 35
Another common thread in the treaty shopping patterns is that
these patterns often are based on taxpayer-favorable national revenue
laws. For example, prior to the inclusion of the LOB provision in the
U.S.-Netherlands DTC, this treaty was a popular treaty shopping
tool,36 in part, because the Netherlands domestic revenue laws im-
posed neither debt-to-equity ratio requirements with respect to busi-
ness entities within the jurisdiction, nor any withholding tax on
interest payments flowing from the Netherlands to other jurisdic-
tions.3" Additionally, when to the U.S.-Netherlands treaty was ex-
tended to the Antilles, taxpayers could take advantage of the Antilles
bank secrecy laws.3" These domestic laws create incentives for treaty
shopping. As long as such incentives exist, unilateral anti-abuse mea-
sures in other isolated jurisdictions will not effectively resolve the
problem of treaty shopping.
Several treaty shopping schemes exploit the favorable inter-
play of two or more domestic systems of taxation, which can be illus-
trated by the phenomenon of "hybrids"3 9-entities, 4 ° transactions, or
32 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and U.S. courts have restricted use of con-
duit companies. See infra Part III.A.
33 BORREGO, supra note 15, at 30-31.
34 Id. at 27-29.
35 JON E. BISCHEL & ROBERT FEINSCHREBER, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION 273 (2d ed. 1985).
36 See Wacker, supra note 8, at 383; Robert Joseph Pineau, Note, Revenue Ruling
84-152: The Beginning of the End for Treaty Shoppers, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &
CoM. 170, 171 (1985).
37 INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING AFTER THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 § 9.03 [3] [b]
(Jon E. Bischel et al. eds., 1989).
38 Pineau, supra note 36, at 174.
39 Daniel Shaviro, More Revenues, Less Distortion? Responding to Cross-Border
Tax Arbitrage, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 113, 119 (2004).
40 Philip R. West, Foreign Law in U.S. International Taxation: The Search for
Standards, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 147, 180-82 (1996).
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instruments, 4 ' which jurisdictions classify differently. For instance,
prior to the 1997 Taxpayer Relief Act,4 2 under the "Cayman sandwich"
hybrid scheme,4" Canadian residents receiving dividends on U.S. stock
could transfer the stock (along with the right to receive dividends) to
an entity formed in the Cayman Islands.4 4 Canadian revenue law
would treat such entity as a corporation, whereas U.S. law would treat
it as a partnership."5 As a result, for U.S. tax purposes, the U.S.-Ca-
nada treaty would reduce the withholding tax."6 For the purposes of
Canadian tax, as a "foreign affiliate"47 this entity would not pay tax.
The Cayman Islands would not tax this entity either," which would
effectively allow the Canadian taxpayers to escape at least a portion of
their U.S. tax.
Similar principles apply to hybrid instruments and transac-
tions."9 For example, stock repurchase agreements constitute a loan
for U.S. tax purposes, but may constitute equity for purposes of taxa-
tion in other jurisdictions5 0 Such divergent characterizations result
in the treaty exemption of the withholding tax on interest, an interest
deduction in the United States, and a non-recognition of income
abroad.5 ' Thus, as these patterns demonstrate, treaty shopping ulti-
mately stems from a lack of coordination between national taxation
systems.
B. The U.S. Policy with Respect to Treaty Shopping
As a matter of U.S. tax policy, treaty shopping is problematic in
several ways. First, as the previously discussed examples demon-
41 Andriy Krahmal, International Hybrid Instruments: Jurisdiction Dependent
Characterization, 5 Hous. Bus. & TAx L.J. 98 (2005).
42 The use of this scheme was limited by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and
Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(d). Taxpayer Relief Act of 1977, Pub.L. 105-34 § 1054(a)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. 894(c)) (denial of treaty benefits for certain payments
through hybrid entities).
43 West, supra note 40, at 180-82. The no-longer available "Bermuda sandwich"
also took advantage of domestic revenue laws in Bermuda. See THOMPSON, supra
note 5, at 169.
4 West, supra note 40, at 180-82.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, ch. 1, § 95(1), (4) (5th Supp.) (1985) (Canada);
see also Geoffrey S. Turner, Property Distributions Under Canadian Foreign Affili-
ate Proposals, 40 TAx NOTES INT'L 1191, 1191 n.1, 3 (2005) (discussing recent
changes and proposals to the "foreign affiliate" regime in Canada).
" West, supra note 40, at 180-82.
'9 Krahmal, supra note 41.
50 Treas. Reg. §1.861-2(a)(7) (2004).
51 Krahmal, supra note 41, at 13-16.
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strate, treaty shoppers escape their tax liability in the United States,
which negatively affects the national tax revenue. Second, in treaty
shopping patterns, treaty benefits flow to residents of third jurisdic-
tions, while U.S. citizens and residents do not receive a reciprocal ben-
efit in those jurisdictions. 52 Third, the absence of anti-abuse measures
in effect rewards treaty shoppers for creating conduits and entering
into transactions that lack in economic substance. Each of these con-
cerns is addressed below.
Treaty shopping results in loss of revenue for the United States
due to the fact that treaty shoppers do not pay tax that is otherwise
owed. In DTC negotiations, the United States agrees to reduce its
source taxation in exchange for a reciprocal concession by the treaty
partner in favor of U.S. residents. 3 Generally, such concessions are
based on data pertaining to the income flow between the countries that
are entering into a DTC.5 4 Where a country is concerned with losing
revenues as a result of such treaty concessions, the country's govern-
ment may compensate for the shortfall in another fashion, for exam-
ple, by increasing resident taxation. 5 Treaty shopping upsets this
calculation because when third-country residents access treaty bene-
fits, the source jurisdiction loses income, which is not accounted for or
otherwise offset. In fact, corporate tax returns filed in the United
States in recent years show an increase in the interest payments by
foreign-controlled U.S. corporations to their affiliates in countries that
have DTCs without LOB provisions, such as Hungary,5 6 for the benefit
of their mutual parent company in a non-treaty jurisdiction.5 7 These
payments at least partially escape U.S. taxation and result in a loss of
U.S. revenue. For this reason, anti-abuse measures seeking to elimi-
nate treaty shopping, such as LOB provisions in DTCs, protect the
United States' tax base.
The possibility of treaty shopping also defeats an incentive for
third-party States to negotiate DTCs with the United States. Such
third-party States do not need to concede their source taxation of U.S.
residents in those countries, because their residents already have an
opportunity to take advantage of existing U.S. DTCs with other coun-
52 Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, HP-494, Testimony of Treasury Inter-
national Tax Counsel John Harrington Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on Pending Income Tax Agreements (July 17, 2007), available at http://
www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp494.htm.
53 See BORREGO, supra note 15, at 51-52; PAUL R. McDANIEL ET AL., INTRODUCTION
TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 178 (2005).
51 See BORREGO, supra note 15, at 51-52; West, supra note 40, at 179.
55 See BORREGO, supra note 15, at 53.
56 REPORT ON TAX TREATIES, supra note 3.
57 Id. at 5, 74-85.
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tries. 5' Before 1992, for example, Canada refused to negotiate an
amendment to the DTC with the United States, which would have ad-
ded an LOB provision, because Canadian investments were channeled
through the Netherlands under the U.S.-Netherlands treaty, which at
that time contained no LOB provision.5 9 After an LOB provision was
added to the U.S. -Netherlands treaty, Canada also agreed to include a
version of such a provision in its treaty with the United States.6 ° This
shows that the use of LOB provisions in U.S. DTCs strengthens the
position of the United States in future DTC negotiations. 6
The U.S. anti-treaty shopping policy also advances the princi-
ple of horizontal equity and promotes efficient resource allocation. The
principle of horizontal equity ensures that similarly situated taxpay-
ers are treated similarly under the tax laws.6 2 This principle opti-
mizes the taxpayers' resource allocation by discouraging the creation
of artificial entities and transactions which do not contribute to the
economy and do not generate economic surplus.6 3 In effect, anti-abuse
measures remove the incentive to distort taxpayers' economic
choices.6 4
Some commentators warn that anti-treaty shopping measures
may impede the United States' ability to attract foreign capital6 5 and,
consequently, increase the cost of credit available to U.S. businesses.6 6
For example, in the 1960s, U.S. companies could access relatively
cheap credit in the Eurobond market. These companies issued debt
instruments through their subsidiaries in the Netherlands Antilles.
The interest payments on those instruments were exempted under the
U.S. -Netherlands Antilles treaty and were not taxed by the Nether-
lands Antilles.67 These tax benefits resulted in a low cost of credit,
58 See UN REPORT ON TREATY SHOPPING, supra note 19, T 22.
59 BORREGO, supra note 15, at 54 n.39.
60 Id.
61 See id. at 14.
62 Dionisios D. Stathis, Compatibility of Anti-Treaty Shopping Policies with Basic
International Trade Imperatives: Relevance of Fiscal Equity and Neutrality in the
International Trade Regime and Lessons for International Tax Lawyers, 1
MANCHESTER J. INT'L ECON. L. 20, 23 (2004).
63 See BORREGO, supra note 15, at 55.
64 See Stathis, supra note 62, at 20, 23.
65 See Daniel Shaviro, Money on the Table?: Responding to Cross-Border Tax Arbi-
trage, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 317, 318 (2002); see also UN REPORT ON TREATY SHOPPING,
supra note 19, T 92.
66 See Wacker, supra note 8, at 383, 389; Pineau, supra note 36, at 175-76.
67 Frith Crandall, The Termination of the United States-Netherlands Antilles Tax
Treaty: What Were the Cost of Ending Treaty Shopping?, 9 Nw. J. INT'L & Bus. 355,
360-61 (1988).
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which was no longer available after the United States terminated the
U.S.-Netherlands Antilles treaty in 1987.68
Despite this apparent interrelation between tax benefits and
the cost of borrowing, mere toleration of treaty shopping inefficiently
decreases the cost of credit. Treaty shopping results in the low cost of
foreign credit at the price of losing U.S. revenue; this shows that the
low cost of credit merely reflects an indirect subsidy to treaty shoppers
from the U.S. government. If the United States makes a decision to
allocate government funds for the purpose of lowering the cost of
credit, cutting credit rates or providing direct subsidies may be more
manageable and efficient. Unlike passive toleration of treaty shop-
ping, with the expectation of attracting foreign capital, affirmative do-
mestic measures, such as tax incentives for specific businesses or
groups of taxpayers, would reach the intended beneficiaries. As such,
the negative effect of anti-abuse policies on the United States' effort to
maintain an affordable cost of credit is overstated.
C. Global Perspective on Treaty Shopping
The United States' national interests overlap with policies of
"the world welfare," 69 which concern the global efficiency7" and coordi-
nation of national tax systems. From the global perspective, treaty
shopping often results in double non-taxation-a situation where an
item of income escapes taxation in two or more jurisdictions. 7 1 For
example, in the Eurobond market, creditors exempted U.S. withhold-
ing tax on interest under the U.S.-Netherlands Antilles treaty and did
not pay tax in the Netherlands Antilles. In such situations, neither
jurisdiction, both having contributed to the creation of the infrastruc-
ture for the economic activity, collects a portion of the economic sur-
plus created by the activity. Treaty shoppers escape their share of
public spending expenses, which pertain to the administration of jus-
tice, industry regulation, and public utilities, both in the source and
the residence jurisdictions. 72 For this reason, in its study of harmful
international tax competition, the Organisation for Economic Co-Oper-
ation and Development (OECD) labeled this phenomenon as "free-rid-
ing."73 Moreover, instead of paying taxes, treaty shoppers allocate
their resources to form artificial tax-motivated structures that have
68 See id.
69 See Shaviro, supra note 65, at 317, 318.
70 Shaviro, supra note 39, at 115.
71 UN REPORT ON TREATY SHOPPING, supra note 19, 22.
72 Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. [OECD], Harmful Tax Competition: An
Emerging Global Issue, at 24-25 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Harmful Competition
Report].
73 Id.
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little benefit to world welfare, other than that a portion of the eco-
nomic surplus is diverted to the services sector, including the legal ser-
vices field. From the global economic perspective, treaty shopping is an
inefficient phenomenon.
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF STATES' UNILATERAL ANTI-
ABUSE MEASURES
To advance their anti-abuse policy, States may implement uni-
lateral and/or multilateral anti-abuse measures. Unilateral measures
encompass promulgation of domestic revenue laws and regulations,
while multilateral measures include the incorporation of the LOB pro-
visions in DTCs. In the past thirty years, the United States has uni-
laterally limited treaty benefits through its court decisions, revenue
statutes, and administrative law,7 4 raising several questions.
A. The United States' Unilateral Anti-abuse Measures
The domestic revenue law in the United States includes unilat-
eral anti-abuse measures embodied in judicial doctrines, legislature
and administrative law. Under the economic substance doctrine, "a
court may deny tax benefits arising from transactions that do not re-
sult in a meaningful change to the taxpayer's economic position other
than purported reduction in federal income tax."7 5 When applied to
interpretation of DTCs, the economic substance doctrine represents a"general" anti-abuse rule as opposed to a "specific" rule that identifies
and targets specific schemes and/or transactions.7 6 The U.S. Congress
and Treasury have implemented numerous "specific" anti-abuse rules
in the past decades, but these measures reveal significant limitations.
71 See Anthony C. Infanti, Curtailing Tax Treaty Overrides: A Call to Action, 62 U.
PiTT. L. REV. 677 (2001); David Sachs, Is the 19th Century Doctrine of Treaty Over-
ride Good Law for Modern Day Tax Treaties?, 47 TAx LAW. 867 (1994); H. David
Rosenbloom, Toward a New Tax Treaty Policy for a New Decade, 9 AM. J. TAX
POL'y 77, 78 (1991).
75 Yoram Keinan, It is Time for the Supreme Court to Voice its Opinion on Eco-
nomic Substance, 7 Hous. Bus. & TAX L. J. 93, 94 (2006).
76 See generally Communication from the Commission to the Council, the Euro-
pean Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, The Applica-
tion of Anti-Abuse Measures in the Area of Direct Taxation within the E.U. and in
Relation to Third Countries, at 2, COM (2007), 785 final (Dec. 10, 2007), available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0785:FIN:
EN:PDF (discussing "general " and "specific" anti-abuse rules) [hereinafter 2007
E.C. Commc'n].
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1. The Inconsistent Application of the Judicial Anti-abuse Doctrines
A discussion about U.S. judicial anti-abuse doctrines usually
begins with the 1971 decision in Aiken Industries Inc. v. Commis-
sioner.7 7 In that case, a U.S. subsidiary borrowed funds from its par-
ent company in Ecuador, and in order to be able to exempt the interest
payments under the U.S.-Honduras treaty, paid the interest to a sub-
sidiary in Honduras. 7' The U.S. Tax Court disallowed treaty benefits
in this back-to-back loan because, in the absence of a business purpose,
the Honduran affiliate acted as a "conduit" for passing the interest
payments to the parent in Ecuador.7 9
A similar scenario resulted in a different outcome in the 1995
case Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Commissioner.s° In that
case, a U.S. parent borrowed funds in the Eurobond market through
its Netherlands Antilles subsidiary and exempted interest payments
to the subsidiary under the U.S.-Netherlands treaty."1 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit distinguished
this case from Aiken Industries Inc. in that in Northern Indiana Public
Service Co., the subsidiary conducted a "concededly minimal activity,
but business activity nonetheless." 2 According to Northern Indiana
Public Service Co., the subsidiary's profit of one-percent spread be-
tween the interest the subsidiary received from the parent and the in-
terest the subsidiary paid to its creditors on Eurobonds, was sufficient
to establish the existence of a "business activity." 3
The 2001 case, Del Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner,8 4 however, shows that courts may subject the "business pur-
pose" to greater scrutiny than accorded in Northern Indiana Public
Service Co. In Del Commercial Properties, Inc., through a chain of
transactions involving its Netherlands subsidiary, a U.S. company ac-
cessed financing ultimately provided by the Royal Bank of Canada.8 5
The U.S. company argued that its subsidiary's "business purpose" was
to secure savings in Canadian tax.8 6 The Tax Court and the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected this con-
tention and denied benefits under the U.S.-Netherlands treaty be-
17 Aiken Indus. Inc. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 925 (1971).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 341, affd, 115 F.3d 506 (7th Cir.
1997).
81 Id.
82 N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm'r, 115 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 1997).
83 Id.
84 Del Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Comm'r, 251 F.3d 210 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
85 Id. at 211-13.
86 Id.
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cause the taxpayer failed to provide evidentiary support for its
purported business purpose and did not cite any relevant provisions of
the Canadian tax code."
This trilogy of cases demonstrates that through court decisions,
the economic substance doctrine developed elasticity that anticipates
financial innovation and other creations of taxpayer's ingenuity. The
application of this doctrine, however, lacks uniformity."8 The doctrine
has developed through individual cases involving complex transac-
tions, which taxpayers can arguably distinguish, and when applied
prospectively, the doctrine fails to provide sufficient predictability for
taxpayers' planning. To complicate the matter, terms such as "sub-
stance-over-form," "step-transaction," "business purpose," "sham
transaction," and "economic substance" are often used interchangea-
bly. 9 In that background, Congress was also taking steps to combat
treaty shopping.
2. U.S. Legislative Anti-abuse Measures
The Congressional response to treaty shopping was less
nuanced than that of the U.S. courts. As early as in 1986,90 in passing
the Tax Reform Act, 9 1 Congress expressed its intention to go as far as
to override "on a wholesale basis '9 2 tax treaties permitting treaty
shopping.9 3 Subsequently, Congress enacted several other statutes
which sought to curtail treaty shopping.9 4 In response, some commen-
87 Id. at 215.
88 Karen B. Brown, U.S. Tax Avoidance, Treaty Shopping and the Economic Sub-
stance Doctrine in the United States, 2 BRITISH TAX R. 160, 160 (2008).
89 See Yoram Keinan, Rethinking the Role of the Judicial Step Transaction Princi-
ple and a Proposal for Codification, 22 AKRON TAX. J. 45, 45-47 (2007); Keinan,
supra note 75.
90 Congress expressed its intent to override tax treaties as early as in 1962. Reve-
nue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 31, 76 Stat. 961, 1069 (1962) (indicating that
the statute overrides tax treaties); see also Infanti, supra note 74, at 681 n.16 (ex-
plaining that Congress expressed its intent to override tax treaties, but the U.S.
Treasury commented that the proposed statute did not conflict with any treaties,
except for Greek Estate Tax Treaty which U.S. Treasury would seek to
renegotiate).
91 The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
92 Richard L. Doernberg, Legislative Override of Income Tax Treaties: the Branch
Profits Tax and Congressional Arrogation of Authority, 42 TAX LAW. 173, 174
(1989).
93 H.R. CONF. REP. 99-841, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4734-38 [herein-
after H.R. CONF. REP. 99-841].
94 See Infanti, supra note 74, at 682-83 (providing a list of statutes which over-
rode tax treaties).
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tators9 5 and United States' treaty partners96 have criticized "treaty
override" as a violation of international law. This, however, does not
change the fact that, as a matter of the U.S. domestic law, Congress
has the power to enact anti-abuse statutes that override DTCs.
Two features of the United States' constitutional design make
tax treaty override possible.9 The first is that two different branches
of the U.S. government are responsible for treaties and revenue stat-
utes.9" The Treasury Department negotiates tax treaties,9 9 and the
President signs them "upon advice and consent" of the Senate,1 0 0
while and the House of Representatives initiates tax legislation.'
The House of Representatives has "little political capital"'0 2 in the tax
treaty process and, thus, has passed bills overriding DTCs that favor
non-residents (who are also usually non-voters). The second feature is
that the U.S. Constitution places statutes and treaties on equal foot-
ing10 3 and does not expressly identify a mechanism for resolving any
potential conflicts between these two sources of law.'0 4 In response,
the U.S. courts developed rules which aim to resolve conflicts between
treaties and domestic law.
9' See, e.g., COMM'N ON U.S. ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN TAXPAYERS AND FOREIGN Ac-
TIVITIES OF U.S. TAXPAYERS, N.Y. S. BAR ASS'N, LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES OF TAX
TREATIES (1987), reprinted in New York State Bar Association Tax Section Opposes
Treaty Override Provisions in the Technical Corrections Bill, 37 TAX NOTES 931
(1987); Infanti, supra note 74, at 682-83; Rosenbloom, supra note 74, at 77-78;
Sachs, supra note 74, at 876.
96 See, e.g., Letter from Emmanuel de Margerie, France's Ambassador to the
United States, to James Baker III, United States Treasury Secretary, July 16,
1987, reprinted in EEC Group of Six Addresses 1986 Act's Treaty Override Provi-
sions, 36 TAX NOTES 437 (1987) [hereinafter Letter from France's Ambassador to
the United States].
97 BITTKER ET AL., supra note 21, 65.1.6; Irwin Halpern, United States Treaty
Obligations, Revenue Laws, and New Section 7852(d) of the Internal Revenue
Code, 5 FLA. INT'L L. J. 1, 25 (1989).
98 See Halpern, supra note 97, at 3.
99 See U.S. CONGRESS, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, TAX TREATIES AND STATUS OF PROPOSED TAX TREATIES (Joint
Comm. Print 1979).
100 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
101 Id. art. I, § 7, cl.1.
102 William P. Streng, U.S. Tax Treaties: Trends, Issues, & Policies in 2006 and
Beyond, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 853, 864 (2006).
103 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2 ("the laws of the United States... and treaties...
shall be the supreme law of the land").
104 Halpern, supra note 97, at 5.
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These rules emerged in the nineteenth century, well before the
United States entered into its first tax treaty in 1932.105 The Charm-
ing Betsy 10 6 canon requires that statutes should be interpreted to
avoid conflicts with treaties.' °7 Where the conflict is unavoidable,
under the "last-in-time rule," the later source, whether the statute or
the treaty, prevails.' 8 For instance, in the 1870 case where the U.S.
Supreme Court first adopted the last-in-time rule, a later enacted stat-
ute imposing taxes on liquor and tobacco overrode a treaty with the
Cherokee nation.'0 9 Congress codified the "last-in-time" rule as ap-
plied to "any law of the United States affecting revenue" in 1988.110
Today, domestic revenue law should be "applied with due regard" to
United States' treaty obligations, where such obligations came into ef-
fect after August 16, 1954.111 But neither treaties nor statutory law
have "preferential status by reason of its being a treaty or law."1 12
These legal mechanisms allowed Congress to enact statutes targeting
treaty shopping patterns and in effect override inconsistent provisions
of DTCs.113
One of the early treaty overrides justified by anti-treaty shop-
ping considerations was contained in the 1986 Tax Reform Act. 1 14 In
that statute, Congress imposed a new tax on foreign corporations with
105 Convention and Protocol Between the United States of America and France
Concerning Double Taxation, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 27, 1932, 49 Stat. 3145; see also Julian
G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Fed-
eral Statutes, 80 IND. L. J. 319 (2005).
106 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 2 Cranch 64, 64 (1804).
107 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888); Pekar v. Comm'r. 113 T.C. 158, 161
(1999) (finding that in the absence of a conflict between a provision of the Internal
Revenue Code and a treaty "the Code and the treaty should be read harmoniously,
to give effect to each").
108 See Kappus v. Comm'r., 337 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that even if 26
U.S.C. § 59(a)(2), which limits the allowable foreign tax credit, conflicts with the
U.S.-Canada DTC, the statute prevails under the "last-in-time" rule); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (1987);
McDANIEL ET AL., supra note 53, at 178.
109 The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616 (1870).
110 26 U.S.C. § 7852(d) (providing that where a treaty and a tax law conflict,
"neither the treaty nor the law shall have preferential status by reason of its being
a treaty or law").
1 26 U.S.C. § 894.
112 26 U.S.C. § 7852(d).
113 See Infanti, supra note 74, at 682-83 (providing a list of statutes which over-
rode tax treaties, including anti-abuse statutes); Sachs, supra note 74, at 876,
871-74 (listing statutes which overrode tax treaties, including anti-abuse
statutes).
114 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
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U.S. branches." 5 The statute acknowledged that DTCs would exempt
such tax and it disallowed such exemption in "cases of treaty shop-
ping.' 116 Legislative history explains that it was "necessary to prevent
nonresidents of a treaty country from gaining benefits the treaty ac-
cords."" 7 To distinguish such nonresidents, the statute provides tests
for "qualified residents.""'
The "qualified resident" test uses corporate ownership as a
proxy for nexus with the treaty jurisdiction, with the intent of ensur-
ing the entity claiming treaty benefits is not a conduit. Under this
test, a foreign corporation does not "qualify" for treaty benefits if fifty
percent or more is owned by non-residents of the treaty jurisdiction or
the United States, or if fifty percent or more of the corporation's in-
come is used (directly or indirectly) to meet liabilities to non-residents
of such treaty jurisdiction or the United States." 9 Corporations pub-
licly traded in the treaty jurisdiction or wholly-owned by a U.S. corpo-
ration or a corporation publicly traded in the treaty jurisdiction also
fall under the definition of a "qualified resident."'2 ° As a result, the"qualified resident" regime limited the treaty shopping analysis to a
set of bright-line objective criteria.
Similar to the economic substance doctrine, the objective "eq-
uity ownership look-through" test 12 ' used under the "qualified resi-
dent regime" results in disallowance of treaty benefits in typical"conduit" scenarios. This test, however, has oversimplified the eco-
nomic substance approach in that this test effectively defines treaty
shopping through a set of rather arbitrary objective factors, as opposed
to the examination of all the relevant circumstances. Under the test,
an entity with fifty percent of resident ownership is regarded as a
treaty shopping pattern, while forty-nine is not. For this reason, the"qualified resident" regime presents a revenue grab conflicting with
DTCs, despite the purported justification as anti-treaty shopping
measure.
After 1986, Congress continued enacting specific anti-abuse
provisions with bright-line, objective criteria for treaty-benefits dis-
qualification. For example, earnings-stripping rules generally disqual-
ify excessive deductions for interest paid to certain exempt or partially
exempt persons122 according to certain numeric criteria, such as debt-
115 26 U.S.C. § 884.
116 H.R. CONF. REP. 99-841, supra note 93.
117 Id.
118 26 U.S.C. § 884.
119 Id. § 884 (e)(4).
120 Id. § 884 (e)(4)(B)-(C).
121 Halpern, supra note 97, at 17.
122 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§ 7210(a)-(b), 103 Stat. 2339, 2342 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 163(j)); see also Omni-
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to-equity ratio exceeding 1.5 to 1. The anti-inversion provision, 1
2 3
which serves as a disincentive for tax-motivated expatriations of U.S.
companies, also utilizes numeric criteria. 124 This provision discour-
ages restructurings that change the place of incorporation of the par-
ent in a corporate group from the United States to a foreign country,
such as Cayman Islands or Bermuda.' 25 The imposed tax disincentive
depends on the percentage of continuing U.S. ownership, 26 so at least
sixty percent results in disallowance of any offsets created in the in-
version transaction and at least eighty percent results in treatment of
the newly created foreign corporation as a U.S. corporation.' 2 7
The statutory specific anti-abuse rules,' 28 as opposed to gen-
eral judicial anti-abuse doctrines, sacrifice flexibility, characteristic of
judicial doctrines, for clarity and convenience. The numeric tests, such
as the fifty percent resident ownership requirement, are formalistic in
that treaty-shoppers may simply find ways to comply with the literal
language of such rules. 129 Formalism, of course, is a rather trivial crit-
icism of legal rules in general. 130 But the irony of this case is that the
anti-abuse rules are supposed to combat treaty shopping, a byproduct
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13238, 107 Stat. 508
(codified as 26 U.S.C. § 7701).
123 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 801(a), 118 Stat.
1565 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7874).
124 See Marco Blanco et al., The Noose Tightens: The New Expatriation Provisions,
106 TAx NOTES 91 (2005).
125 Michael Kirsch, The Congressional Response to Corporate Expatriations: The
Tension between Symbols and Substance in the Taxation of Multinational Corpo-
rations, 24 VA. TAx REV. 475, 478 (2005).
126 See 26 U.S.C. § 7874.
127 See id.
128 Senate Finance Committee is currently reviewing the Stop Tax Haven Abuse
Act, a sponsor of which was then-Senator Barack Obama. The bill proposes,
among other things, to codify the economic substance doctrine, which would be a
general anti-abuse rule. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, H.R. 2136, 110th Cong. § 401
(2007).
129 Doernberg, supra note 92, at 186 (noting with respect to Section 884 that "it is
disturbing that the new Code provisions place such a premium on form").
130 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)
("Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most mindless is that it is
formalist. The answer to that is, of course it's formalistic! The rule of law is about
form . . .A murderer has been caught with blood on his hands, bending over the
body of his victim; a neighbor with a video camera has filmed the crime and the
murderer has confessed in writing and on videotape. We nonetheless insist that
before the state can punish this miscreant, it must conduct a full-dress criminal
trial that results in a verdict of guilty. Is that not formalism? Long live formalism!
It is what makes us a government of laws and not of men.").
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of other formalistic rules, such as the place of incorporation,1 3 1 under
which, for example, as in Johansson, a corporation formed by a Swed-
ish resident in Switzerland is deemed a Swiss corporation. Because of
this formalism, specific anti-abuse rules are less likely than judicial
anti-abuse doctrines to address new forms of treaty shopping. At the
same time, objective criteria set forth in specific anti-abuse rules pro-
vide bright-line guidelines for the taxpayers and tax authorities, and
thus, increase predictability and ease the tax administration.
3. Administrative Anti-abuse Measures in the United States
Along with U.S. courts and Congress, the U.S. Treasury and
the IRS have also been concerned with the problem of treaty shopping
since the early 1980s. The U.S. Treasury attempted to renegotiate the
DTCs that provided treaty shopping opportunities, but "tax havens"
had little incentive for re-visiting these agreements. 13 2 In this context,
the IRS took steps to curb treaty-abuse through its revenue rulings,
and the U.S. Treasury promulgated regulations responding to the Con-
gress' request for anti-abuse measures.' 33 These measures, however,
raised the issue of whether, under the Constitution, administrative
guidance may limit the scope of United States' treaties, resulting in
treaty override.
It is clear that revenue rulings and regulations may interpret
U.S. domestic statutes or treaty provisions that already limit bene-fits. 1 3 4 Where a treaty is silent on the limitation on benefits, the appli-
cation of the economic substance doctrine to treaties may also be
arguably consistent with treaty obligations as an interpretation of the
treaty.'3 5 For example, in Revenue Ruling 84-152136 the IRS ex-
amined a back-to-back loan. Under the terms of that arrangement, a
U.S. subsidiary of a Swiss company borrowed funds from a Nether-
lands Antilles subsidiary at the interest rate of eleven percent annu-
ally. The Netherlands Antilles subsidiary, in turn, borrowed from the
Swiss parent at the rate of ten percent annually. Similarly to Aiken
Industries Inc., the IRS concluded that the U.S-Netherlands treaty did
not exempt the interest the U.S. subsidiary paid to the Netherlands
131 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(4) (defining "domestic corporation" as "created or organ-
ized" in the U.S. or under the laws of the U.S. or any U.S. State).
132 Pineau, supra note 36, at 170-71.
133 See, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13238, 107 Stat. 508 (codified at 26 U.S.C. 7701).
13' Richard L. Doernberg, Treaty Override by Administrative Regulation: The
Multiparty Financing Regulations, 2 FLA. TAx REv. 521, 523 (1995).
135 Id. at 528.
136 Rev. Rul. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B.; see also Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. (the U.S.-
Netherlands DTC does not exempt interest payments a U.S. made to a U.S. parent
through a Netherlands Antilles subsidiary).
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Antilles intermediary because the intermediary lacked a "sufficient
business purpose." 3 ' Despite the fact that this decision was more ex-
pansive than Aiken Industries Inc., as it required a "sufficient business
purpose" rather than "some" business purpose as in Aiken Industries
Inc., 3 ' the disallowance arguably did not override the treaty but
rather interpreted it.
It remains more controversial as to under what circumstances
administrative law may disallow benefits that are "clearly permitted
by the treaty."'3 9 Under the Constitution, to have legal force, the gui-
dance of the U.S. Treasury requires an authorization of Congress.' 40
As such, commentators question whether Congress may, as a matter of
U.S. constitutional law, delegate its power to override treaties to the
U.S. Treasury, 141 and if so, whether any such authorization has to be
explicit.' 4 2 For instance, in 1993 Congress authorized the U.S. Trea-
sury to promulgate regulations re-characterizing multiple-party fi-
nancing transactions,143 but did not expressly state any intent to
override DTCs. 1'4 4 The promulgated regulations effectively deny
treaty benefits in certain financing transactions, 45 but the validity of
these regulations is yet to be determined by the courts and the process
of invalidation of regulations may take decades.' 4 6 Given this uncer-
tainty, in the United States, unilateral administrative anti-abuse mea-
sures present a problematic avenue for combating treaty shopping.
137 Id.; ERNEST R. LARKINS, INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS OF U.S. INCOME TAx
LAW: INBOUND AND OUTBOUND TRANSACTIONS 43-44 (2004); Pineau, supra note 36,
at 170.
138 Pineau, supra note 36, at 178.
139 See Doernberg, supra note 134, at 523, 530.
140 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1978).
141 See, e.g. Doernberg, supra note 134, at 533-44.
142 See, e.g. Anthony C. Infanti, The Proposed Domestic Reverse Hybrid Entity
Regulations: Can the Treasury Department Override Treaties, 30 TAx MGM'T INT'L
J. 307, 310-14 (2001).
143 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13238, 107
Stat. 508 (codified at 26 U.S.C. 7701).
144 See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 727-29 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
958-60; H.R. REP. No. 103-213, at 654-55 (1993) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1343-44.
145 See Treas. Reg. § 1.881-3 (1993) (disregarding conduit entities in financing
transactions); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-3(g) (1993) (requiring the financed en-
tity or person to withhold tax with respect to re-characterized portions of interest
payments as determined by § 1.881-3(d)).
146 For example, in 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit found that Treasury Regulation § 1.882-5 violated the 1975 U.S.-U.K. DTC.
The case concerned the tax liability of National Westminster Bank, PLC for the
tax years 1981-1987. Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 512 F.3d
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008), rehearing en banc denied (Apr. 21, 2008).
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B. Comparative Perspective on Domestic Anti-abuse Laws
Other States also face challenges in implementing unilateral
anti-abuse measures. A brief survey of recent developments in the
area of unilateral anti-abuse measures in Canada, India, and the Eu-
ropean Union provides an insight into the variety of issues that arise
in individual States' legal systems in the course of those States' at-
tempts to curb treaty shopping. To be clear, under the "revenue rule"
U.S. courts would not apply or enforce, even indirectly, revenue laws of
other sovereigns. 147 But such laws are relevant to the U.S. anti-treaty
shopping policy because, as discussed earlier, treaty shopping schemes
arise from the interplay of treaties and national tax laws.
1. Canada Is Developing a Methodology for Applying Anti-abuse
Rules to DTCs
North of the United States border, the Canada Revenue
Agency (CRA) has challenged artificial, treaty-abusing structures, but
so far without avail. In 2005, the Canadian legislature extended the
General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR) of the Income Tax Act to trea-
ties.1 4 In June of 2007, the Federal Court of Appeal (the court that
hears appeals from the Tax Court of Canada)' 4 9 decided the first case
on this issue, The Queen v. MIL (Investments) S.A. 150
The case involved Mr. Boulle, resident, at relevant times, of Be-
lize and Monaco, who ultimately held shares of a Canadian company
through MIL (Investments) S.A., a Cayman Islands corporation oper-
ating out of Luxembourg. The proceeds from the sale of shares were
exempted from tax in Canada under the Canada-Luxembourg treaty
and not subject to tax in Luxembourg. Given this incidence of double
non-taxation, CRA argued that the transaction in question was an"avoidance transaction" under GAAR."' The court recognized the tax-
payer's admission that its continuance as a Luxembourg corporation
147 Att'y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d
Cir. 2001) (holding that the "revenue rule" barred Canada's claim where Canada
sought to recover under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, the lost revenue and law enforcement costs from
defendants who had allegedly smuggled cigarettes across U.S.-Canadian border
for sale on the Canadian black market and avoided Canadian cigarette taxes).
148 Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 1 § 245 (1985).
141 See Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., ch. F-7 § 3, ch. 34 § 68(F), ch.8 § 16 (1985), as
amended, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cs/F-7///en; see also
http://www.fca-caf.gc.ca/index-e.shtml.
150 The Queen v. MIL (Investments) S.A., [2007] F.C.A. 236 (Can.), available at
http://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/en/2007/2007fca236/2007fca236.html; see also MIL
(Investments) S.A. v. The Queen, [2006] T.C.C. 460 (Can.), available at http:l!
decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/en/2006/2006tcc460/2006tcc460.html.
151 Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 1 § 245 (1985).
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was tax-motivated, but found that neither the treaty, nor GAAR sup-
ported the proposition that the tax benefits received in the course of
this transaction resulted in abuse or misuse of the treaty. 152 This case
has shown that "the Crown is ready and willing"' 5 3 to enforce anti-
abuse measures in the context of DTCs, but it is yet to be seen how this
will be accomplished.
In a subsequent case, Prdvost Car Inc. v. The Queen,15 4 the
CRA advanced a different theory and argued that where a Nether-
lands holding company received dividends on stock of a Canadian cor-
poration and distributed them to its shareholders in Sweden and the
United Kingdom, such shareholders were the "beneficial owners" of
the dividends.' 5 5 In its decision in April of 2008, the Tax Court of Ca-
nada refused to pierce the Netherlands holding company's corporate
veil. 156 The court pointed out that the holding company had discretion
in use of its assets, had its own liabilities, and was not merely in-
structed to receive funds. 5 ' The holding company's function was dif-
ferent from, for example, that of a "stockbroker who is the registered
owner of the shares it holds for clients." 5 ' Both MIL (Investments)
S.A. and Prdvost Car Inc. were decided in favor of the taxpayers, but
these cases indicate that the CRA may continue to challenge entities
and/or transactions that lack economic substance.
2. India is Interpreting the Terms "Liable to Tax" and "Subject to
Tax"
Several recent decisions in India have defined the scope of
treaty benefits through interpretation of the concept of eligibility
under the DTCs. In a 2003 case, India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, 9
the Supreme Court of India 6 ° considered the eligibility for benefits
under the 1983 Mauritius-India DTC. 16 ' This DTC expressly limits its
benefits to persons "liable to taxation" in the treaty jurisdiction.'6 2
152 MIL (Investments) S.A., [2007] F.C.A. 236.
153 Kimberly Brown, Tax Treaty Shopping and the GAAR: MIL (Investments) S.A.
v. The Queen, 66 U. TORONTO FAC. L.REv. 33, 36 (2008).
154 Provost Car Inc. v. The Queen, [2008] T.C.C. 231, available at http://decision.
tcc-cci.gc.ca/en/2008/2008tcc23112008tcc231.html.
155 Id. s 1.
156 Id. 100.
157 Id. 9 102.
158 Id. 100.
159 Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, [20031 263 I.T.R. 706 (India), availa-
ble at http://www.gov.mu/portalsites/ncb/fsc/download/supreme.pdf.
160 See Supreme Court of India, http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2009).
161 Azadi Bachao Andolan, [2003] 263 I.T.R. 706 (S.C.).
162 Id.
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The case involved Foreign Institutional Investors (FIls), entities which
were incorporated in Mauritius, that possessed Tax Residency Certifi-
cates issued by the Mauritius Tax Authorities, but were managed and
controlled by third-country residents. 16 3 As Mauritius does not gener-
ally impose capital gains tax, the court had to decide whether the FlIs
are in fact "liable to taxation" in Mauritius within the meaning of the
Mauritius-India DTC.1 64 The court found that actual imposition of tax
was irrelevant, and the FIls were entitled to treaty benefits because
Mauritius tax laws apply to the FIIs. 16 5 Interestingly, the Supreme
Court of India mentioned the Johansson case where the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied the economic substance doc-
trine. 166 The Supreme Court of India distinguished Johansson in that
in Azadi Bachao Andolan the term "resident" was expressly defined in
the Mauritius-India DTC and the FIIs met this definition. 16 7 In the
court's view, literal compliance with the treaty terms entitled the FlIs
to treaty benefits. 168
Following the taxpayer-favorable Azadi Bachao Andolan, the
Authority for Advance Ruling of India (AAR) (an administrative body
providing binding advance rulings) 169 issued several decisions which
limited entitlements to treaty benefits. In Abdul Razak A. Meman, 170
the AAR interpreted the term "liable to tax" under the India-United
Arab Emirates (UAE) treaty.17' The AAR considered a case of an indi-
vidual-resident of the United Arab Emirates who received investment
income on certain Indian assets. 172 The fact that individuals in UAE
are not subject to income tax allowed AAR to conclude that the individ-
ual was not "liable to tax within the meaning of the treaty."'7 3 The
AAR distinguished this case from Azadi Bachao Andolan, which em-
phasized the irrelevance of actual imposition of tax, in that the Mauri-
tius Tax Authorities in Azadi Bachao Andolan by virtue of issuing the






167 Azadi Bachao Andolan, [2003] 263 I.T.R. 706 (S.C.).
168 See id.
169 See Authority for Advanced Rulings, http://aar.gov.in/ (last visited Feb. 21,
2009).
170 Abdul Razak A. Meman, A.A.R. No. 637, 638 & 640 OF 2004, 276 I.T.R. 306
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This distinction, however, is yet to be clarified, especially after
the 2005 AAR ruling in General Electric Pension Trust. 175 The ruling
interpreted eligibility requirements under the U.S-India DTC, which
provides that a trust is a "resident" of a treaty jurisdiction only to the
extent its income is "subject to tax" in that jurisdiction.' 7 6 In this rul-
ing, the taxpayer was a U.S. tax-exempt pension trust, 177 which made
investments in India.'7 s Based on the fact that the taxpayer was ex-
empt from tax in the United States, the AAR concluded that General
Electric Pension Trust was not a "resident" of the United States, and
thus not entitled to treaty benefits.' 7 9 While these three decisions in-
terpreted the language of different tax treaties and could be distin-
guished on that basis, it is uncertain whether the courts of India will,
in the future, agree with the AAR's interpretation of the terms "liable
to tax" and "subject to tax."
To clarify any confusion, India and the UAE recently signed a
protocol addressing the "contentious issue"' 0 of individuals' eligibility
under the India-UAE treaty. Under this protocol, a taxpayer is a "resi-
dent" of the UAE within the meaning of the India-UAE treaty if such
taxpayer meets certain physical presence requirements.' 8 ' It remains
to be seen, however, how Indian tax authorities and courts, as well as
their treaty partners, will address the issue of treaty eligibility with
respect to other India's DTCs.
3. The European Union Is Limiting Anti-abuse Measures To
"Wholly Artificial Arrangements"
Anti-abuse laws in the countries of the European Union are
also in a state of flux. The European Commission (the executive body
of the European Union) 8 2 is currently reviewing domestic anti-abuse
rules of the E.U. Member States to ensure their compliance with the
E.U. law. In the European Union, Member States may not unjustifi-
175 Gen. Elec. Pension Trust, A.A.R. No. 659 of 2005, 280 I.T.R. 425 (2005), availa-
ble at http://rulings.co.in/ruling/show-ruling/156.html.
176 Id.
177 26 U.S.C. § 401(a).
178 Gen. Elec. Pension Trust, A.A.R. No. 659 of 2005.
179 Id.
180 K.R. Sekar et al., Indian Update, 19 J. INT'L TAX'N 54, 56 (2008).
181 Id.
182 See Commission of the European Communities, Governance Statement of the
European Comission, at 2, (May 30, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/
synthesis/doc/governance-statement en.pdf; see also Michael J. Graez et al., In-
come Tax Discrimination and the Political and Economic Integration of Europe,
115 YALE L.J. 1186, 1190 (2006) (discussing the lawmaking and enforcement pro-
cess in the European Union).
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ably infringe on the "freedom of establishment."" 3 This principle re-
quires E.U. Member States to treat persons of other E.U. Member
States equally, compared to its own persons.' 8 4 As a result of this
ongoing review, the European Commission, for example, has requested
Spain to furnish an explanation for its discriminatory anti-abuse rules
in the area of taxation, such as the discriminatory exemption of divi-
dends tax afforded only to Spanish companies.'8 5 Recent E.U. case
law illustrates the view of the European Commission on anti-abuse
laws.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has recently limited to"wholly artificial arrangements" the permissible scope of anti-abuse
rules in E.U. Member States, as applied to other E.U. Member States.
In the 2006 case Cadbury Schweppes Plc v. Commissioners, 186 the ECJ
examined a U.K. anti-abuse rule which imposed tax on the profits of
subsidiaries of U.K. companies outside of the United Kingdom if such
profits were taxed at a rate lower than the U.K. tax rate.18 7 In that
case, a U.K. parent company established two wholly-owned subsidiar-
ies in Ireland to raise capital for entities within its corporate group.' 8 8
As Ireland imposed only a ten percent tax on the two subsidiaries, a
rate lower than the U.K. tax rate, the United Kingdom sought to en-
force its anti-abuse rule.'8 9 The ECJ found that this rule disadvan-
taged conduct of business in E.U. Member States and, therefore,
restricted the freedom of establishment. 9 ° Under this decision, such
restriction could be justified only if it were limited to "wholly artificial
arrangements intended to escape the national tax normally paya-
ble."' This means that anti-abuse rules should be limited to such
arrangements.
In its October 2007 Communication, the European Commission
likened this standard to the substance-over-form analysis.' 2 The E.U.
approach, however, differs from the U.S. substance-over-form doctrine.
In the European Union, national anti-abuse rules must "serve the spe-
183 Treaty Establishing the European Community (consolidated text), art. 43, 48,
2002 O.J. (C325) 52-57 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
184 Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes Plc v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006
E.C.R. 1-7995, 41, 42.
185 European Commission Challenges Spain on Anti-Abuse Rules, INT'L TAX R.,
Apr. 1, 2008, at 4.
186 Cadbury Schweppes Plc, Case C-196/04.
187 See id. 3-5, 75.
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cific purpose of preventing wholly artificial arrangements." 9 3 Con-
trastingly, in the United States the IRS requires a "sufficient," not
merely "some" business purpose for an entity to avoid conduit charac-
terization.' 94 Taxpayers in the United States have the burden of proof
in establishing the "business purpose," which is illustrated by the Del
Commercial Properties, Inc. decision.' 95 In comparison, in the Euro-
pean Union, the individual governments of the E.U. Member States
carry the burden of justifying any discriminatory treatment of re-
sidents of other E.U. Member States, as shown by Cadbury Schweppes
Plc.' 6 As such, the scope of the E.U. "wholly artificial arrangements"
test is narrower than that of the U.S. substance-over-form doctrine.
It should be kept in mind, however, that the E.U. law limits
E.U. Member States' right to assess direct tax on residents of other
E.U. Member States,' 9 7 but not on residents of other countries. So it
remains to be seen whether this internal E.U. reform will also change
national anti-abuse measures of E.U. Member States with respect to
residents of non-E.U. countries. In any case, the harmonization of
E.U. national anti-abuse laws to ensure compliance with the principle
of freedom of establishment may in the future significantly distinguish
these laws from those adopted in the United States, Canada, and
India.
4. Conclusions from a Comparative Survey of States' Unilateral
Anti-abuse Measures
The above analysis leads to two conclusions. First, as States'
anti-abuse measures vary, unilateral measures in one country alone
may not effectively discourage treaty shopping as a global problem.
The United States' anti-abuse measures may discourage treaty shop-
ping by U.S. persons or in connection with U.S. income, but it will not
eliminate treaty shopping as a phenomenon. A long-term solution of
the treaty shopping problem should take into consideration other ju-
risdictions' practices.' 98 Second, a comparative survey of anti-abuse
measures shows that States' understanding of what constitutes "treaty
abuse" differs. Where treaty shopping is not defined in a DTC, but
instead left up to the interpretation of individual States' courts and
193 Id. at 3.
194 Pineau, supra note 36, at 178.
195 Del Commercial Properties, Inc., 251 F.3d 210, 215-16 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
196 Cadbury Schweppes Plc, Case C-196/04.
197 See, e.g., id. T[ 40.
198 See West, supra note 40, at 148; see generally Charles I. Kingson, The Coher-
ence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151 (1981) (discussing anti-
abuse measures instituted in select foreign countries).
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administrative agencies, treaty partners may disagree on such inter-
pretation and perceive it as a violation of the DTC.
C. Status of Unilateral Anti-abuse Measures under International
Law
States' unilateral anti-abuse measures may be inconsistent
with their international obligations. Under the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (VCLT), States must fulfill their treaty obligations
in accordance with the principle ofpacta sunt servanda-good faith.1 9 9
By signing DTCs, States promise to provide tax benefits to the re-
sidents of the treaty partner.20 ' For this reason, unilateral disallow-
ance of such benefits resulting in a treaty override may constitute a
treaty breach. 2 0 '
In the past three decades, the United States implemented sev-
eral anti-abuse measures which effectively overrode DTCs, which was
made possible as a result of the last-in-time rule in the U.S. domestic
law. The interaction of the U.S. last-in-time rule and international
law has yielded peculiar results. A U.S. court may be restrained by
the last-in-time rule and precedent, and thus, uphold the treaty over-
ride, while the international law analysis may demand a different out-
come. Under international law, however, States may not rely on their
domestic law in justifying their breach of treaty obligations.20 2 In-
stead, States may rely on norms derived from such sources of interna-
tional law as treaties ,203 customary international law,20 4 and the
general principles of law.20 5 These sources provide arguments for the
199 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The United States has not ratified this conven-
tion, but considers it binding customary international law. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. f(1987).
200 See, e.g., 2006 U.S. Model, supra note 11, pmbl.
201 See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties; Observance and
Breach, 95 AM. J. INTL L. 313 (2001).
202 Vienna Convention, supra note 199, art. 26, 27.
203 Treaties constitute express agreements between States. Treaties bind the
States that have ratified such treaties. Vienna Convention, supra note 199, art. 2(1)(a), (b), 11-19.
204 Customary international law encompasses the rules adopted by the States in
their practice or a "tacit agreement" of certain States to such rule, from which,
nevertheless, other States may derogate. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
153-154 (2d ed. 2005).
205 The general principles of law are commonly understood as "the principles en-
dorsed by the developed domestic legal systems of different states," for example,
the principle of good faith. DAVID BEDERMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: A HAND-
BOOK FOR JUDGES 32 (2003); BING CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED
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disallowance of treaty benefits, as well as proposing some solutions for
the problem of treaty override.
1. Anti-abuse Measures and the Scope of States' Obligations under
DTCs
Several canons of treaty interpretation may support the con-
tention that certain unilateral anti-abuse measures may be consistent
with States' obligations under DTCs. Such canons look to the text of
the treaty, the treaty's object and purpose, the signatories' subsequent
practice, and the general principles of international law-principles
which are endorsed by developed national legal systems.2" 6 Generally,
these canons allow for liberal interpretation of treaties,2" 7 which, how-
ever, does not mean that the treaty language may be "stretched" indef-
initely or interpreted against its plain meaning.
In the absence of an LOB provision in a DTC, an express "sav-
ings clause" and a "gap-filling clause" may justify the adoption of cer-
tain domestic anti-abuse rules. A typical savings clause provides that
nothing in the DTC will prevent a State from imposing taxes on their
residents and citizens, as if the DTC was not in effect.20 ' A gap-filling
clause would usually instruct that terms that are not specifically de-
fined in the treaty will be interpreted by reference to domestic laws, as
enacted from time to time.2" 9 These clauses may support promulga-
tion of some unilateral anti-abuse measures, but commentators cau-
tion that the language of such savings clauses cannot be expanded
indefinitely to provide a blanket authorization for any domestic anti-
abuse laws.2 10
"Purposive" interpretation of DTCs-interpretation in light of
their object and purpose 2'-may also allow for application of certain
anti-abuse measures. The VCLT provides that treaties should be in-
terpreted by giving effect to the ordinary meaning of their text and "in
the context and in the light of' 2 12 their object and purpose. DTCs' pur-
pose is both to avoid double taxation and prevent fiscal evasion.2 13 For
this reason, the IRS has argued that tax treaties do not create an abso-
BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 105-158 (1987); G.M. DANILENKO, LAw-
MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 175 (1993).
206 id.
207 Nathalie Goyette, Tax Treaty Abuse: A Second Look, 51 CANADIAN TAX J. 764,
778 (2003).
208 2006 U.S. Model, supra note 11, art. 1 (3).
209 See UN REPORT ON TREATY SHOPPING, supra note 19, 91 92.
210 Id. 9 93.
211 See Maurice Cashmere, GAAR for the United Kingdom? The Australian Expe-
rience, 2 BRITISH TAX R. 125 (2008).
212 Vienna Convention, supra note 199, art. 26, 27.
213 See, e.g., 2006 U.S. Model, supra note 11.
2008] SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF TAX-TREATY SHOPPING 275
lute entitlement to be free from double taxation because avoiding
double taxation is aspirational, in contrast to terms like "prohibiting,""eliminating," or "preventing" double taxation.2 1 4 Unilateral anti-
abuse measures, at least arguably, are consistent with the States'
pledge to prevent fiscal evasion.
States' subsequent practice in applying the treaty "establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation,"2 1 5 and thus,
may also legitimize certain anti-abuse measures.21 6 Where revenue
authorities of both India and the United States, for example, deny
treaty benefits under a certain set of circumstances, such subsequent
mutual practice would put in question the right of either party to in-
voke a breach of international obligations.
As numerous States have implemented unilateral anti-abuse
rules, such rules have arguably become general principles of interna-
tional law.2" 7 Similar to other recognized general law principles, such
as the attorney-client privilege21 ' and the principle of good faith,21 9
anti-abuse measures may play a role of a "gap-filler" in international
law. As such, anti-abuse principles aiding in treaty interpretation
may be imposed by operation of law. Admittedly, as was discussed
earlier, States differ in their understanding of the appropriate scope or
methodology for anti-treaty shopping measures. But where States ac-
cept a particular rule in principle, courts can select the lowest common
denominator on which the relevant States agree. 220 This interpreta-
tive approach would more likely succeed in justifying disallowance of
conduits devoid of any non-tax business purpose (for example, wholly
214 Jamieson v. Comm'r. 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1430 (2008) (The IRS argued that while
the intent of DTCs is to avoid double taxation, that does not mean that DTCs
prohibit any instances of double taxation).
215 Vienna Convention, supra note 199, art. 31(3)(b).
216 See Robert Critchfield et al., Pass-Through Entities, Double Tax Conventions,
and Treaty Overrides, 82 TAx NOTES 873, 889 (1999).
217 Goyette, supra note 207, at 769; Haug, supra note 6, at 191, 234; see also
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 TAx L. REV. 483,
495 (2004).
218 See Case 155/79, AM&S Europe Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1982 E.C.R. 1575 (finding
that where the European Community Treaty and subordinate legislation do not
address the issue of attorney-client privilege and where comparative analysis of
national legal systems shows unanimous recognition of such privilege, the Euro-
pean Community law incorporates the principle of attorney-client privilege as a
general principle of international law).
219 See supra text accompanying note 205.
220 Goyette, supra note 207, at 771; see also AM&S Europe Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1982
E.C.R.1575 (finding that the attorney-client privilege is a general principle of in-
ternational law).
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artificial arrangements), rather than of entities with some, but limited
purpose.
2. Certain Anti-abuse Measures May Not "Materially Breach" DTCs
Even where anti-abuse measures do not merely complement or
interpret a treaty, to constitute a violation of international law, such
measures must "materially" breach the treaty.22 ' The VCLT distin-
guishes the "material breach" from other acts of noncompliance in that
a "material breach" is a "repudiation of the treaty," or a violation of "a
provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of
the treaty. 2 2 2 As DTCs have the dual purpose of avoiding double tax-
ation and preventing fiscal evasion,2 23 disallowance of treaty benefits
in treaty shopping schemes may arguably conflict with the purpose of
providing relief from double taxation. At the same time, if a State tol-
erates treaty shopping, such an approach may violate the purpose of
preventing fiscal evasion. This tension shows that the determination
as to the existence of a material breach depends on the scope of a par-
ticular anti-abuse measure.
Denial of treaty benefits to conduits may be also be consistent
with treaty obligations in light of the status of conduits under interna-
tional law. Generally, States may assert claims only on behalf of their
constituents, or "nationals."22 4 "Nationality" under international law
is based not only on the act of a formal grant of citizenship by one
State, but also on the basis of all relevant circumstances. In the 1955
Liechtenstein v. Guatemala decision, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) examined the case of Mr. Nottebohm,2 25 a German national by
birth, who obtained formal citizenship of Liechtenstein in the begin-
ning of the Second World War. The ICJ found that Guatemala was not
compelled to recognize such formal grants of citizenship by Liechten-
stein because Mr. Nottebohm had permanently lived in Guatemala for
over thirty years and had tenuous connections with Liechtenstein.2 2 6
As a result, Liechtenstein could not assert a claim against Guatemala
on behalf Mr. Nottebohm. 2 27 The court reasoned that "nationality is a
221 See Vienna Convention, supra note 199, art. 60(3).
222 Id.
223 See, e.g., 2006 U.S. Model, supra note 11.
224 See Barcelona Traction Case (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5), 33-36
(finding that Belgium may not assert a claim against Spain for an injury to a Ca-
nadian corporation owned by Belgian nationals and operating in Spain because
the injured corporation, was not a Belgian constituent; the case did not implicate
an erga omnes obligation-obligation owed to the international community as a
whole, such as to refrain from aggression or genocide).
225 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
226 Id. at 26.
227 Id.
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legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the
existence of reciprocal rights and duties."22" As to conduits, their exis-
tence in the treaty jurisdiction may be limited to the lawyer's desk.2 29
This means that because conduits' ties with the treaty jurisdiction are
tenuous, under international law, such treaty jurisdiction may not as-
sert claims on behalf of such conduits. Given that, where one State
denies treaty benefits to a conduit in a treaty jurisdiction, such State
does not breach any duty owed to the treaty partner under the DTC.
3. Remedies and Solutions for the Problem of Treaty Override
Where anti-abuse measures do not fall under any of the above-
discussed categories justified under international law, the next issue
that should be addressed is the remedies that are available to the ag-
grieved party. Commentators have widely acknowledged the lack of
mechanisms for enforcement of international law, and thus realisti-
cally available remedies.2 3 ° Historically, major powers "released
themselves from treaty obligations when they deemed it fit. '23 1 As
General de Gaulle once reportedly put it, treaties "are like roses and
young girls; they last while they last."232 Today, however, some DTCs
offer a creative solution to this problem-a "baseball-style arbitra-
tion," which will be discussed below.
The issue of legitimacy of the United States' treaty override
does not seem to have a forum for judicial adjudication.2 3 3 In deciding
tax treaty override controversies, U.S. courts do not reach the interna-
tional law issues because they are constrained by the last-in-time rule
and by precedent. 23 4 A lawsuit against the United States in foreign
domestic courts is likely to be precluded by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, under which foreign States are generally immune from
suits in domestic courts, 235 and the Act of State Doctrine, "which pre-
vents courts from passing judgment on the international validity of
foreign sovereign acts."2 36 The ICJ has not decided a single case in-
228 Id. at 23.
229 Lee A. Sheppard, News Headlines: Preventing Corporate Inversions, 26 TAx
NOTES INT'L 8, 11 (2002).
230 See, e.g., BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMES-
TIC LEGAL SYSTEMS 7 (1993).
231 CASSESE, supra note 204, at 180.
232 Id. at 180 n.9 (citing ECONOMIST 6, Mar. 18, 1972).
233 See John Turro, U.S. Treaty Overrides Criticized by IFA Members, 45 TAX
NOTES 22, 23 (1989).
234 See infra Part III.A(b).
235 LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
POLICY ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 234-36 (2d ed. 2002).
236 Id. at 236-40; CONFORTI, supra note 228, at 20.
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volving a tax treaty and is unlikely to address such an issue in the
near future.2 3 7 Furthermore, any adjudication of such a case would
require the United States' consent due to the fact the United States
withdrew its consent to the ICJ's jurisdiction in 1985.238 In this con-
text, tax treaty disputes require new, creative solutions.
One such solution is the mandatory arbitration clause, or the
so-called "baseball-style arbitration." A recently signed protocol to the
U.S.-Germany DTC contains such a clause, which provides for binding
arbitration of cases which the competent authorities of the two States
could not resolve. 23 9 In "baseball-style arbitration," each side submits
its proposed settlement offer and the arbitrator selects one of the of-
fers.2 4 ° The arbitrator may not modify the offers and must choose ei-
ther one or the other, and so each State has an incentive to propose a
balanced, compromise solution. The resolution of a specific dispute,
however, does not address the root of the problem-the lack of agree-
ment on the scope and application of anti-abuse rules in the different
national systems.
Even where unilateral anti-abuse measures are consistent
with States' obligations under DTCs and where remedies for breach
are available, unilateral measures, as opposed to collective action, are
limited in a number of ways. First, the arguments justifying unilat-
eral anti-treaty shopping measures have not been fully tested in litiga-
tion, which means that parties to DTCs may vastly disagree on their
positions. Second, imposition by implication of anti-abuse measures
into internationally binding agreements that affect States' budgets
and constituents is an undesirable policy due to the uncertainty of
such an approach. Third, when a treaty partner perceives certain uni-
lateral measures of the other party as breaching the treaty, the rela-
tionship between the parties and the trust that they have built in the
course of their treaty negotiations are at stake.2 4 1 For these reasons,
unilateral anti-abuse measures should be considered a temporary so-
lution to the treaty shopping problem and limited to the most flagrant
cases of treaty abuse. Where possible, States should seek to incorpo-
rate anti-abuse measures in the text of DTCs.
237 See, e.g., John Turro, U.S. Treaty Overrides Criticized by IFA Members, 45 TAX
NOTES 22, 23 (1989) (observing that litigation in the ICJ has been a "theoretical
solution").
238 Doernberg, supra note 92, at 205 n.213.
239 JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, EXPLANATION OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL TO THE IN-
COME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY (JCX-47-07) 69,
July 13, 2007.
240 Tax Executives Institute, Pending Canadian Income Tax Issues, 59 TAX EXEC.
77, 77 (2007).
241 See, e.g., Letter from France's Ambassador to the United States, supra note 96.
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IV. LOB PROVISIONS AS A SOLUTION TO THE TREATY
SHOPPING PROBLEM
Several clauses in DTCs may serve as anti-abuse measures.
For example, the 2006 U.S. Model limits treaty benefits to "re-
sidents,"2 4 2 defined as persons "liable to tax" '2 4 3 in a country-treaty sig-
natory. Another provision, the so called "tie-breaker" clause,
addresses the issue of "dual" residents, including, for instance, corpo-
rations formed in one State-party to the DTC and operating in the
other.2 4 4 A "Limitation on Benefits" (LOB) provision specifically deals
with treaty shopping patterns and sets forth the rules by which treaty
signatories elect "to confine source-country treaty benefits to entities
that are true residents of the treaty partner and are fully taxable in
that country."24 5
A. The Evolution and Mechanics of Limitation on Benefits
Provisions in U.S. DTCs
The United States pioneered the use of LOB provisions in
DTCs.2 46 Since the 1980s the U.S. Treasury Department has pursued
an anti-treaty shopping policy.2 47 Beginning with the 1981 U.S. Model
Treaty, the United States has included some version of an LOB provi-
sion in all of its treaties. 24' LOB provisions emerged as clauses seek-
ing to capture the subjective treaty shopping intent of the taxpayer,
but gradually developed into the LOB provision contained in the 2006
U.S. Model, 2 49 which adopts several objective tests addressing modern
treaty shopping tactics.
1. The Emergence of the Objective Tests of LOB provisions
Early LOB provisions disallowed treaty benefits for entities
that were formed with the "principal purpose" of taking advantage of
the treaty benefits.25 ° Given the difficulty of administering rules asso-
ciated with taxpayers' subjective intent,25 1 newly negotiated LOB pro-
visions began utilizing objective criteria. The primary aspect of these
objective criteria was limiting the percentage of ownership in the cor-
242 2006 U.S. Model, supra note 11, art. 1.
243 Id. art. 4(1).
244 Id. art. 4(4).
245 Postlewaite et al., supra note 7, at 768.
246 BORREGO, supra note 15, at 13.
247 McDANIEL ET AL., supra note 53, at 182.
248 Id. at 183.
249 2006 U.S. Model, supra note 11.
250 McDANIEL ET AL., supra note 53, at 182-183.
251 See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Where is the Italian Treaty?, 108 TAX
NOTES 986, 987-989 (2005).
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porate taxpayer by residents of third countries. As a result, the 1977
U.S. Model Tax Treaty required at least 25 percent ownership by
treaty jurisdiction residents, while the proposed 1981 U.S. Model Tax
Treaty imposed a 75 percent-ownership requirement.25 2 After Con-
gress introduced what the above-discussed "qualified resident" regime,
LOB provisions in newly negotiated treaties were adjusted to reflect
the tests contained in that section. The "qualified resident" regime
thus became a prototype of the modern LOB provision.2 5 3
2. The Mechanics of the LOB Provision in the 2006 U.S. Model
The effect of the LOB provision in the 2006 U.S. Model is that
it disallows benefits in classic treaty shopping schemes. As a thresh-
old, under 2006 U.S. Model, only a "resident," or a person "liable to
tax" in the place of residence, 254 may receive treaty benefits. The LOB
provision further narrows the pool of recipients of benefits under the
DTC. This provision is flexible because it allows treaty benefits for
qualifying persons and, where taxpayers do not meet the criteria, in
the alternative, for qualifying items of income.2 55
As for the first alternative, the eligibility of persons, under the
LOB provision, residents would qualify if they fall into one of the fol-
lowing six categories: (1) individuals, (2) governments of the signato-
ries to the DTC, (3) certain charitable organizations and pension funds
with more than 50 percent of participants residing in either of the
treaty signatories,2 5 6 (4) certain corporations that are either publicly-
traded or managed or controlled by resident(s) in one of the treaty sig-
natories,2 5 7 (5) subsidiaries of corporations that are at least 50 per-
cent-owned by the residents of the DTC signatories, 258 and (6) entities
that meet the two-part "ownership and base erosion" test.2 59 This test
ensures that 50 percent or more of each class of shares or other benefi-
cial interests in the entity is owned for at least half of the entity's taxa-
ble year by residents entitled to the treaty benefits.2 6 ° Hence, this
252 Wacker, supra note 8, at 384.
253 Id. at 389.
254 2006 U.S. Model, supra note 11, art. 4(1) (defining "resident" as "person who,
under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile,
residence, citizenship, place of management, place of incorporation, or any other
criterion of a similar nature, and also any "qualified governmental entity").
255 Id. art. 22.
256 Id. art. 4(1)(b), 22(d)-(e).
257 Id. art. 22(2)(c)(i).
258 Id. art. 22(2)(c)(ii).
259 Id. art. 22(2)(e); DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
ACCOMPANYING THE U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION 68-69 (2006).
260 2006 U.S. Model, supra note 11, art. 22(2)(e).
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first alternative provides relatively easy access to treaty benefits for
individuals, governments, and charities, but scrutinizes other entities.
Certain items of income may qualify for treaty benefits inde-
pendently of the above test. This applies in a situation where a resi-
dent of one State-signatory actively conducts a trade or business in
that State and, "in connection with" or "incidental to" that trade or
business, derives income in the other State-party to the DTC.2 6 1 The
resident may establish a connection between the resident's trade or
business in one State and its activity in the other State by showing
that such activity is a line of business that "forms part of' the trade or
business (such as distribution in one State of products manufactured
in the other State) or is "complementary to" the resident's trade or bus-
iness (for example, hotel business may be complementary to an airline
business).2 6 2 As such, the LOB provision represents a comprehensive
and flexible way of testing the economic connection2 6 3 of the taxpayer
with the claimed country of residence, the core issue in the treaty
shopping problem.
B. Addressing the Criticism of LOB Provisions in U.S. DTCs
Commentators raise several objections to the use of LOB provi-
sions. The negotiation of LOB provisions is a costly and time-consum-
ing process.264 The use of LOB provisions may also seem merely to
duplicate the existing domestic anti-abuse rules. These provisions
may also seem excessive2 6 5 given that comparable model DTCs, such
as the OECD Model2 6 6 and the United Nations (UN)2 67 Model do not
have such provisions.2 6 s In addition, some commentators argue that
LOB provisions in United States' treaties with European Union coun-
tries may conflict with the principle of freedom of establishment under
E.U. law.2 69 These criticisms, however, do not warrant abandonment
of the LOB provisions.
261 See id. art. 22(3); DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 257, at 69-72.
262 Notably, a business of making or managing investments for its own account
(unless it is a bank, insurance company or registered securities dealer) does not
fall under this definition. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 257, at 69.
263 See McDANIEL ET AL., supra note 53, at 184.
264 See OECD Harmful Competition Report, supra note 72, at 38; see also S. REP.
No. 100 445, at 323 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4515, 4834.
265 See generally Reinhold, supra note 9, at 663.
266 OECD Model, supra note 14.
267 UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NA-
TIONS MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES (2003) [hereinafter UN Model].
268 See OECD Model, supra note 14; UN Model, supra note 267; Avi-Yonah, supra
note 217, at 495.
269 See generally Mason, supra note 10, at 65.
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1. Cost-benefit Analysis of the Use of LOB Provisions
Negotiation and implementation of treaty clauses, including
LOB provisions, is admittedly a more time and resource consuming
endeavor than implementation of unilateral measures. 2 70 Renegoti-
ation 2 7 1 of treaty provisions to reflect changing provisions of U.S. do-
mestic anti-abuse law may also be difficult.2 72 Unilateral measures,
however, are inferior to LOB provisions, as unilateral measures have
limited jurisdictional reach and may conflict with international law.
Each of these considerations should be factored into the cost-benefit
analysis of LOB provisions.
Unilateral measures fail to address the root of the treaty shop-
ping problem: the lack of coordination between national tax systems.
In the absence of an LOB provision, where India or Canada, for exam-
ple, do not discourage treaty shopping under the U.S.-India or U.S.-
Canada treaty, United States anti-abuse measures are limited to the
U.S. tax. This means that unilateral anti-abuse measures "could only
curtail flagrant cases of treaty shopping2 73 and would not eliminate
treaty shopping patterns. By contrast, treaty provisions combat treaty
shopping in the combined jurisdictions of the countries-signatories.
Treaty provisions are not intended to replace domestic revenue laws
since it is through domestic laws that taxes are ultimately imposed.2 74
LOB provisions, however, do help to coordinate the tax systems, and
thus contribute to their collective efficiency. As such, the U.S. Trea-
sury considers LOB provisions a "critical area" that provides "signifi-
cant deterrence against" treaty abuse.2 76
In the absence of LOB provisions, stringent domestic anti-
abuse measures by one State may complicate its relations with the
treaty partner. Unilateral anti-abuse measures may be viewed as "ag-
gressively grabbing"2 76 the joint economic surplus available for taxa-
tion to both States. In fact, United States treaty partners have in the
past objected to the United States' treaty overrides, which raised the
risk that treaty partners would terminate the DTCs. 2 77 In the event
270 OECD Harmful Competition Report, supra note 72, at 38; see also S. REP. No.
100-445, at 323; Rosenbloom, supra note 74, at 81.
271 M.L. Dionne, Branch Profits Tax and Treaty Override Problems May Be Re-
solved; White Paper on Treaty Policy Underway, 39 TAx NOTES 799 (1988);
Doernberg, supra note 92, at 198.
272 S. REP. No. 100-445, at 323.
273 Wacker, supra note 8, at 385.
274 UN Report on Treaty Shopping, supra note 19, 92.
275 REPORT ON TAX TREATIES, supra note 3, at 5; see also Andrew H. Kingissepp,
Long-Awaited Protocol to Canada-U.S. Tax Treaty Provides Significant Benefits,
18 J. INT'L TAX'N 22 (2007).
276 Shaviro, supra note 39, at 133.
277 See, e.g., Letter from France's Ambassador to the United States, supra note 96.
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that a DTC is terminated, the U.S. foreign credit regime 27 would be-
come the primary source of double taxation relief in the United States.
This regime, however, imposes significant costs because under it, the
United States foregoes the collection of revenue on the amount of for-
eign taxes that U.S. taxpayers pay abroad and does not necessarily
secure a reciprocal benefit.2 7 9 Should the United States, in response,
move away from the foreign credit regime, the lack of any mechanisms
for ameliorating the effects of double taxation would impede trade and
capital flows. Even where unilateral measures are consistent with in-
ternational law, a perceived breach may undermine both the trust be-
tween the treaty partners and the stability of the international tax
system. For these reasons, States should seek to ascertain and mutu-
ally agree to treaty shopping patterns which will not generate treaty
benefits that can be exploited by the parties.
As for the difficulty in renegotiating LOB provisions, they are
relatively easier to negotiate than, for instance, treaty clauses pertain-
ing to the exchange of information, especially in cases where a treaty
partner is restricted by its domestic secrecy laws.28 ° Given that, the
benefits that LOB provisions afford outweigh the costs, as such clauses
are imperative in improving the overall efficacy of anti-abuse mea-
sures, the stability of the international taxation system and the trust-
worthiness of the United States as a treaty partner.
2. The UN and OECD Models are distinguishable from the 2006
U.S. Model
Another basis for criticism of LOB provisions is that they seem
excessive, in light of the fact that the models developed by the
OECD2 ' and the UN28 2 do not contain such provisions.28 3 However,
unlike the 2006 U.S. Model, which is an expression of the United
States' initial position in DTC negotiations, the OECD and UN Models
are not country-specific and serve as model DTCs for use by a multi-
tude of States. 2 4 The UN and OECD Models could not reflect the spe-
cifics of the tax policies of all the countries of the world because "taxes
are the last topic on which one would expect sovereign nations to reach
278 26 U.S.C. §§ 901, 903 (2006).
279 Charles I. Kingson, The Foreign Tax Credit and Its Critics, 9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y
1 (1991).
280 John Turro, Override Articles May Appear in Future U.S. Treaties, Morrison
Warns; Foreign Officials Discuss ADR, 49 TA NOTES 609, 610 (1990).
281 OECD Model, supra note 14.
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283 See OECD Model, supra note 14; UN Model, supra note 255; Avi-Yonah, supra
note 217, at 495.
284 See Streng, supra note 102, at 860-864.
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a consensus." 2 5 The availability of treaty shopping, however, is deter-
mined by the domestic tax laws specific to the parties to a DTC and
their respective network of the DTCs with other countries. 28 6 Thus,
the 2006 U.S. Model serves different purposes than the UN and OECD
Models, and, for this reason, differs in content.
Even in the absence of an express LOB provision, the OECD
and UN Models arguably contemplate the use of anti-abuse clauses in
DTCs. The commentaries to the OECD Model, which some courts ac-
cept as a binding interpretation of that Model,2" 7 provide that parties
may use anti-abuse provisions.28 8 Moreover, some commentators ar-
gue that DTCs, including the OECD and UN Models, are based on the
assumption that they provide benefits to residents of the treaty signa-
tories, which means that DTCs include implied anti-treaty shopping
measures.28 9 For these reasons, the 2006 U.S. Model's is consistent
with the OECD and UN Models with regard to LOB provisions.
3. Compatibility of LOB Provisions with E. U. Law
Since the late 1980s there has been a debate regarding the
compatibility of LOB provisions and E.U. law,290 specifically, the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination and its manifestations in the principles of
freedom of establishment, freedom to provide services, and freedom of
capital and payments.2 9 1 As discussed above, these principles seek to
lift restrictions on E.U. nationals' ability to conduct trade or do busi-
ness across the borders of E.U. Member States. 292 In treaties between
E.U. Member States and other countries, an LOB provision may result
in discrimination against other E.U. Member States' entities that lack
sufficient economic nexus with the treaty jurisdiction. However, it is
yet to be decided whether such a denial of treaty benefits constitutes
discrimination under E.U. law and, if so, whether the discrimination is
justified, for example, on the grounds of "public policy, public security
or public health. 2 93
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Simplification, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996).
286 See BORREGO, supra note 15, at 56-57.
287 Hugh J. Ault, The Importance of International Cooperation in Forging Tax Pol-
icy, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1693, 1694 (2001); David T. W. Lai, Interpretation of
Double Taxation Agreements in Hong Kong, 37 HONG KONG L. J. 137, 143-51
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The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has not addressed the le-
gality of LOB provisions.2 9 4 Substantively, most closely analogous to
such a potential challenge are the Open Skies cases, where the ECJ
invalidated several bilateral transportation treaties that contained a
nationality clause somewhat similar to the LOB provisions. 29 5 The
area of taxation, however, differs from the regulation of transporta-
tion, in that under international law, the power of States to tax (for as
long as they have the requisite jurisdictional nexus with the taxpayer)
is practically unlimited. 296 Also, in its recent Communication regard-
ing national anti-abuse rules, the E.U. Commission clarified that E.U.
law does not restrict discrimination by the E.U. Member States of es-
tablishments outside of the European Union or establishments of
third-country nationals in the European Union.2 9 7 As E.U. caselaw on
the compatibility of domestic anti-abuse measures with E.U. law
demonstrate, such measures may be justified where limited to "wholly
artificial arrangements.,' 29' This means that LOB provisions that
meet such a limitation should be consistent with E.U. law. Neverthe-
less, the issue of compatibility between LOB provisions and E.U. law
remains untested.
V. CONCLUSION
The current practice of including LOB provisions in the U.S.
DTCs is an important step towards harmonization of the national tax
systems. This practice targets the problem of treaty shopping, which
leads to a revenue loss in the United States, weakens the U.S. position
in future negotiations and creates economic inefficiencies, both in the
United States and globally. Several States have adopted unilateral
measures seeking to combat treaty shopping, but such uncoordinated
measures alone do not completely remove the incentives for treaty
shopping. Moreover, a comparative perspective on anti-abuse laws in
different jurisdictions, such as Canada, India and the European Union
demonstrates that States differ in their views on the appropriate scope
of unilateral anti-abuse principles. This shows the need to raise the
issue of anti-abuse measures in the course of treaty negotiations and
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develop mutually acceptable anti-abuse clauses in DTCs, such as LOB
provisions. A collaborative approach, rather than unilateral one,
would be more likely to succeed in solving the problem of treaty
shopping.
